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企业成本控制外文翻译,有英文原文和翻译英文:36863字符中文:10000多字企业的特点与内部控制重大弱点对萨班斯法案第404评估 stephen bryan 威克森林大学 巴布科克管理学院steven lilien 纽约州立大学巴鲁学院 摘要 著名的萨班斯法案(sox)要求公司评估其内部控制的财务报告并且报告存在的重大...
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内容介绍
原文档由会员 littey 发布企业成本控制外文翻译
有英文原文和翻译
英文:36863字符
中文:10000多字
企业的特点与内部控制重大弱点
对萨班斯法案第404评估
Stephen Bryan
威克森林大学 巴布科克管理学院
Steven Lilien
纽约州立大学巴鲁学院
摘要
著名的萨班斯法案(SOX)要求公司评估其内部控制的财务报告并且报告存在的重大错误,这些重大错误石油公公会计监督委员会规定的。基于早期的证据,我们发现,那些有重大错误的企业,和他们相对应的产业同行相比,他们的决策者团队更小更糟。我们还发现,那些有重大错误的企业,平均上,具有较高的投资和风险系数,也就是这些公司拥有市场提供给他们的更高的折扣。从宏观经济学的角度看,那些报告有重大错误的公司的市场总价值只有S&P500强企业的市场价值的1.28%。最后,虽然我们将不良股票归纳在重大错误的报告中,通过一个很小的间隔,这些是无不足道的。
建立小企业,在对于所有企业来说建立企业都是非常高成本的环境下,貌似是非常不公平的。萨班斯法案是否会带来企业效益,通过更好地运作,降低资金成本,或其他方式还有待观察。 此外,如果这些利益实现,是否应该,实际上是立法的,是一个有争议的问题的。 虽然有些人坚持认为萨班斯法案会减少盈余管理,公司继续通过盈余管理盈余预估。 此外,虽然美国证券交易委员会的注册G号,也立法颁布萨班斯法案的一部分,使系统“通过试算收入的”有管理的披露更为透明,它不能行使收益控制权的和解进程,企业使用这两种设置,满足分析师估计。
Characteristics of Firms with Material Weaknesses in Internal Control: An Assessment of Section 404 of Sarbanes Oxley
Stephen Bryan
Babcock Graduate School of Management
Wake Forest University
Steven Lilien
Baruch College
City University of New York
Abstract The legislation known as Sarbanes Oxley (SOX) requires firms to assess their internal controls over financial reporting and to report material weaknesses, as defined by the Public Accounting Oversight Board. Based upon early evidence, we find that firms with material weaknesses are, on average, both smaller and worse performers than their matched industry counterparts. We also find that firms with material weaknesses, on average, have higher betas, suggesting a higher discount by the market for these firms. From a macro-economic view, the total market value of firms with reported material weaknesses is only 1.28% of the market value of the S&P 500 firms. Finally, although we document negative stock returns on the date of the announcement of the material weakness, over a narrow interval, the returns are insignificant.
Identifying small firms that collectively constitute a minor portion of the economy at a very high cost to all public firms seems out of balance. Whether SOX will yield benefits to corporations through better operations, reduced cost of capital, or other means remains to be seen. Moreover, if these benefits materialize, whether they should, in effect, be legislated is a matter of debate. Although some maintain that SOX will reduce earnings management, firms continue to manage earnings through pro forma earnings. Furthermore, although the SEC’s Reg G, also enacted as part of SOX legislation, makes the “managed disclosure system” through pro forma earnings more transparent, it fails to exercise control over the reconciliation process that firms use both to set and to meet analyst earnings estimate.