大股东控制，私有收益与公司绩效.doc
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大股东控制，私有收益与公司绩效,本文共9页10000余字大股东控制、私有收益与公司绩效摘要：股权结构与公司绩效的关系一直是学者关注的问题，本文认为股权结构与公司绩效的关系是经由中间机制或因素发生作用的，因此引入大股东的私有收益变量。本文以2000年前上市的公司为样本，对2001年至2003年的股权结构、关联资金往来和公司绩效作了实证分析，结果表明我国...
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大股东控制、私有收益与公司绩效
摘要：股权结构与公司绩效的关系一直是学者关注的问题，本文认为股权结构与公司绩效的关系是经由中间机制或因素发生作用的，因此引入大股东的私有收益变量。本文以2000年前上市的公司为样本，对2001年至2003年的股权结构、关联资金往来和公司绩效作了实证分析，结果表明我国上市公司的股权结构普遍存在大股东控制，在大股东控制下，容易出现大股东以资金占用等形式获取私有收益，从而损害公司的经营绩效的现象。
关键词：股权结构；私有收益；绩效
Large Shareholder, Private Benefits and Firm Performance
Abstract: The relationship of ownership structure and firm performance is always the focus of researchers, we believe that the relationship is activated by some mechanisms or factors intermediate, so we introduce the private benefits of corporate control in this study. This study made empirical research on the ownership structure, private benefits and firm performance of Chinese listed companies. The results show that in Chinese stock market, most listed companies are controlled by large shareholders and the controlling shareholders always seized private benefits form listed companies at the cost of listed companies’ performance.
Keywords: ownership structure; private benefits; firm performance
参考文献：
[1] Shleifer ,A. ,and R. Vishny. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J].Journal of Political Econom,1986,94:461-88.
[2] Stulz, Rene M.. Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Marketfor Corporate Control[J]. Journal of Financial Economics , 1988,20:25-54.
[3] Bolton, Patrick, and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden. Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control [J].Journal of Finance,1998,53: 1-25.
[4] Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. A Survey of Corporate Governance[]J. Journal of Finance , 1997,52: 737-83.
[5] Holderness, Clifford G., and Dennis P. Sheehan. The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations: An Exploratory Analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20: 317-46.
[6] Demsetz, Harold & Kenneth Lehn. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences[J].Journal of Political Economy,1985,93:1155-1177.
[7] Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:293-315.
[8] Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. Lang. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings[J].Journal of Finance, 2002,57:2741-2771.
[9] Xu ,X. and Y.Wang. Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies[J].China Economic Review,1999, 10 :75-98.
[10] 孙永祥,黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999,12:23-30
[11] 白重恩,刘俏,陆洲,宋敏,张俊喜.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005,(2):81-89.
[12] 陈小悦,徐晓东.股权结构,企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究, 2001,(11):3-11.
[13] 朱武祥,宋勇.股权结构与企业价值———对家电行业上市公司的实证分析[J].经济研究, 2001,(12):66-72.
[14] 徐莉萍,辛宇,陈工孟.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响[J].经济研究,2006,(1):90-100.
[15] 刘芍佳,孙霈,刘乃全.终极产权论,股权结构及公司绩效[J].经济研究, 2003,(4):51-62.
[16] Grossman, S., and O. Hart. One share-one vote and the market for corporate control[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:175-202.
[17] Johnson, Simon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Salines, and Andrei Shleifer. Tunneling[J]. American Economic Review, 2000,90:22-27.
[18] Ehrhardt Olaf and Eric Nowak. Private Benefits and Minority Shareholder Expropriation.2003,working paper June.
[19] 刘峰,贺建刚,魏明海. 控制权,业绩与利益输送——基于五粮液的案例研究[J].管理世界,2004,(8):45-53.
[20] 刘峰,贺建刚.股权结构与大股东利益输送实现方式的选择[J].中国会计评,2004,(2):56-64.
[21] 李春玲, 王化成.家族性控股股东资本运营策略研究[J].财经问题研究, 2004,(4):86-92.
[22] 李增泉,孙铮,王志伟. “掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究, 2004,(12):3-13.
[23] 曾昭灶，余鹏翼. 私有收益与控制权转移模型分析.预测.2007,(3):65-71.
[24] 李善民,王德友,朱滔. 控制权和现金流权的分离与上市公司绩效[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版), 2006,(6):83-91.
大股东控制、私有收益与公司绩效
摘要：股权结构与公司绩效的关系一直是学者关注的问题，本文认为股权结构与公司绩效的关系是经由中间机制或因素发生作用的，因此引入大股东的私有收益变量。本文以2000年前上市的公司为样本，对2001年至2003年的股权结构、关联资金往来和公司绩效作了实证分析，结果表明我国上市公司的股权结构普遍存在大股东控制，在大股东控制下，容易出现大股东以资金占用等形式获取私有收益，从而损害公司的经营绩效的现象。
关键词：股权结构；私有收益；绩效
Large Shareholder, Private Benefits and Firm Performance
Abstract: The relationship of ownership structure and firm performance is always the focus of researchers, we believe that the relationship is activated by some mechanisms or factors intermediate, so we introduce the private benefits of corporate control in this study. This study made empirical research on the ownership structure, private benefits and firm performance of Chinese listed companies. The results show that in Chinese stock market, most listed companies are controlled by large shareholders and the controlling shareholders always seized private benefits form listed companies at the cost of listed companies’ performance.
Keywords: ownership structure; private benefits; firm performance
参考文献：
[1] Shleifer ,A. ,and R. Vishny. Large Shareholders and Corporate Control[J].Journal of Political Econom,1986,94:461-88.
[2] Stulz, Rene M.. Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Marketfor Corporate Control[J]. Journal of Financial Economics , 1988,20:25-54.
[3] Bolton, Patrick, and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden. Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control [J].Journal of Finance,1998,53: 1-25.
[4] Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. A Survey of Corporate Governance[]J. Journal of Finance , 1997,52: 737-83.
[5] Holderness, Clifford G., and Dennis P. Sheehan. The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations: An Exploratory Analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20: 317-46.
[6] Demsetz, Harold & Kenneth Lehn. The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences[J].Journal of Political Economy,1985,93:1155-1177.
[7] Morck, Randall, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis[J].Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:293-315.
[8] Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. Fan, and L. Lang. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings[J].Journal of Finance, 2002,57:2741-2771.
[9] Xu ,X. and Y.Wang. Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies[J].China Economic Review,1999, 10 :75-98.
[10] 孙永祥,黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999,12:23-30
[11] 白重恩,刘俏,陆洲,宋敏,张俊喜.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005,(2):81-89.
[12] 陈小悦,徐晓东.股权结构,企业绩效与投资者利益保护[J].经济研究, 2001,(11):3-11.
[13] 朱武祥,宋勇.股权结构与企业价值———对家电行业上市公司的实证分析[J].经济研究, 2001,(12):66-72.
[14] 徐莉萍,辛宇,陈工孟.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响[J].经济研究,2006,(1):90-100.
[15] 刘芍佳,孙霈,刘乃全.终极产权论,股权结构及公司绩效[J].经济研究, 2003,(4):51-62.
[16] Grossman, S., and O. Hart. One share-one vote and the market for corporate control[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988,20:175-202.
[17] Johnson, Simon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Salines, and Andrei Shleifer. Tunneling[J]. American Economic Review, 2000,90:22-27.
[18] Ehrhardt Olaf and Eric Nowak. Private Benefits and Minority Shareholder Expropriation.2003,working paper June.
[19] 刘峰,贺建刚,魏明海. 控制权,业绩与利益输送——基于五粮液的案例研究[J].管理世界,2004,(8):45-53.
[20] 刘峰,贺建刚.股权结构与大股东利益输送实现方式的选择[J].中国会计评,2004,(2):56-64.
[21] 李春玲, 王化成.家族性控股股东资本运营策略研究[J].财经问题研究, 2004,(4):86-92.
[22] 李增泉,孙铮,王志伟. “掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究, 2004,(12):3-13.
[23] 曾昭灶，余鹏翼. 私有收益与控制权转移模型分析.预测.2007,(3):65-71.
[24] 李善民,王德友,朱滔. 控制权和现金流权的分离与上市公司绩效[J].中山大学学报(社会科学版), 2006,(6):83-91.
