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隐私与安全 国际通信监测 外文文献译文和原文,隐私与安全 国际通信监测当你发送电子邮件的时候，你是否知道信息的发送会经过哪些国家？在这个世界上，各个国家都使用互联网通过本地设备的通信来收集情报，对于互联网用户来说，无论是个人还是企业，这已成为一个日益重要的问题。这种拦截侦听在全世界的范围内，都被本国法律规定是情报服务和执法机构既定的调查工具。对于政府来说，若涉及...
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隐私与安全 • 国际通信监测
当你发送电子邮件的时候，你是否知道信息的发送会经过哪些国家？在这个世界上，各个国家都使用互联网通过本地设备的通信来收集情报，对于互联网用户来说，无论是个人还是企业，这已成为一个日益重要的问题。这种拦截侦听在全世界的范围内，都被本国法律规定是情报服务和执法机构既定的调查工具。对于政府来说，若涉及国家安全的威胁，为了收集情报而利用一切可利用的资源是很明显可行的。这种监听正在不断地扩大，并且侵害了通信隐私权益。越来越多的国家通过立法，预防在既没有适当的程序限制也没有严格监督的情况下，监测并且收集大量数据的行为活动。在最坏的情况下，政府打擦边球甚至无视规则，也要促进情报的收集工作。
事实上，通过针对国际通信的源头、终点、甚至仅仅是经过某个特定的国家，依据本国法律的标准来对它进行拦截监听，互联网通信的特征都表明了它是超越国家性质的并且有前途的收集情报的新途径。与公共交换电话网（PSTN）不同，公共交换电话网只是发送目的地到国际网关，而互联网通信并不局限于一国之内的范围，在通信过程中更有可能穿越国家的边界。在不久之前，世界绝大部分的数据流入美国这个有着世界最大的互联网骨干网供应商的交换设备的国家（现在这种情况从某种程度上来说已经改变），因此，美国处于一个能够控制世界上通过互联网传递的绝大部分信息的位置。
Privacy and Security
International Communications Surveillance
When you send email, do you know through which countries your communication will be routed ? In a world where countries use the Internet to gather intelligence from communications traffic that transits local facilities, this question has become increasingly important for Internet users—individuals and businesses alike. Such interception is an established investigative tool of intelligence services and law enforcement agencies all over the world provided for by domestic laws. For governments concerned with national security threats, the exploitation of all available sources for intelligence gathering seems obvious. This surveillance is constantly being expanded—to the detriment of communications privacy. Countries are increasingly adopting legislation that provides for preventive surveillance and the massive collection of communications data without either adequate procedural limitations or strict oversight of the activities. In the worst case governments stretch—or even ignore—existing rules in order to facilitate intelligence gathering no matter what.
The fact that Internet traffic is supranational in character offers a promising new avenue for intelligence gathering by targeting international communications originating from, terminating in, or simply passing through a given country and subjecting it to the local standards of legal interception. Unlike the public switched telephony network (PSTN), which delivered only the destined traffic to the international gateways, Internet traffic is not confined to the territory of a state and is more likely to cross borders while in transit. Not long ago the overwhelming majority of data flowed through the U.S., where the world’s top Internet backbone providers’ switching equipment was located (the situation has since changed somewhat). The U.S. was therefore in the position of being able to exercise control over most of the world’s information transmitted via the Internet.
In 2005 the U.S. National Security Agency’s warrantless wiretapping, a program authorized by the Bush administration, was disclosed. Afterward the government pursued legislation to expand surveillance powers. The short-lived 2007 Protect America Act and its immediate successor, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008, permit warrantless interception of international communications during transit through the U.S. and the targeting of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S. Under the latter U.S. act, the highest level of protection is afforded to purely domestic communications, interception of which would require a warrant whereas international communications (with at least one foreign end-point) are more exposed to surveillance activities. If this logic were to be adopted worldwide, a citizen would have privacy of communications only in the nation in which they had citizenship—and then only if the communications remained fully within the nation’s borders, a situation not always guaranteed when using the decentralized architecture of the Internet. From the perspective of all other countries the same Internet communications would be treated as foreign communications and are thus susceptible to surveillance when on transit through their territories. This privacy threat is not just abstract, but is a realistic assessment in a communications environment powered by Internet technologies.
当你发送电子邮件的时候，你是否知道信息的发送会经过哪些国家？在这个世界上，各个国家都使用互联网通过本地设备的通信来收集情报，对于互联网用户来说，无论是个人还是企业，这已成为一个日益重要的问题。这种拦截侦听在全世界的范围内，都被本国法律规定是情报服务和执法机构既定的调查工具。对于政府来说，若涉及国家安全的威胁，为了收集情报而利用一切可利用的资源是很明显可行的。这种监听正在不断地扩大，并且侵害了通信隐私权益。越来越多的国家通过立法，预防在既没有适当的程序限制也没有严格监督的情况下，监测并且收集大量数据的行为活动。在最坏的情况下，政府打擦边球甚至无视规则，也要促进情报的收集工作。
事实上，通过针对国际通信的源头、终点、甚至仅仅是经过某个特定的国家，依据本国法律的标准来对它进行拦截监听，互联网通信的特征都表明了它是超越国家性质的并且有前途的收集情报的新途径。与公共交换电话网（PSTN）不同，公共交换电话网只是发送目的地到国际网关，而互联网通信并不局限于一国之内的范围，在通信过程中更有可能穿越国家的边界。在不久之前，世界绝大部分的数据流入美国这个有着世界最大的互联网骨干网供应商的交换设备的国家（现在这种情况从某种程度上来说已经改变），因此，美国处于一个能够控制世界上通过互联网传递的绝大部分信息的位置。
Privacy and Security
International Communications Surveillance
When you send email, do you know through which countries your communication will be routed ? In a world where countries use the Internet to gather intelligence from communications traffic that transits local facilities, this question has become increasingly important for Internet users—individuals and businesses alike. Such interception is an established investigative tool of intelligence services and law enforcement agencies all over the world provided for by domestic laws. For governments concerned with national security threats, the exploitation of all available sources for intelligence gathering seems obvious. This surveillance is constantly being expanded—to the detriment of communications privacy. Countries are increasingly adopting legislation that provides for preventive surveillance and the massive collection of communications data without either adequate procedural limitations or strict oversight of the activities. In the worst case governments stretch—or even ignore—existing rules in order to facilitate intelligence gathering no matter what.
The fact that Internet traffic is supranational in character offers a promising new avenue for intelligence gathering by targeting international communications originating from, terminating in, or simply passing through a given country and subjecting it to the local standards of legal interception. Unlike the public switched telephony network (PSTN), which delivered only the destined traffic to the international gateways, Internet traffic is not confined to the territory of a state and is more likely to cross borders while in transit. Not long ago the overwhelming majority of data flowed through the U.S., where the world’s top Internet backbone providers’ switching equipment was located (the situation has since changed somewhat). The U.S. was therefore in the position of being able to exercise control over most of the world’s information transmitted via the Internet.
In 2005 the U.S. National Security Agency’s warrantless wiretapping, a program authorized by the Bush administration, was disclosed. Afterward the government pursued legislation to expand surveillance powers. The short-lived 2007 Protect America Act and its immediate successor, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008, permit warrantless interception of international communications during transit through the U.S. and the targeting of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the U.S. Under the latter U.S. act, the highest level of protection is afforded to purely domestic communications, interception of which would require a warrant whereas international communications (with at least one foreign end-point) are more exposed to surveillance activities. If this logic were to be adopted worldwide, a citizen would have privacy of communications only in the nation in which they had citizenship—and then only if the communications remained fully within the nation’s borders, a situation not always guaranteed when using the decentralized architecture of the Internet. From the perspective of all other countries the same Internet communications would be treated as foreign communications and are thus susceptible to surveillance when on transit through their territories. This privacy threat is not just abstract, but is a realistic assessment in a communications environment powered by Internet technologies.
