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公务员挑选：机制设计观点,本文共10页 5000字左右摘要文章从委托-代理的框架上分析了公务员的腐败问题，认为公务员的挑选实际上是一个机制设计问题。由于应聘者的期望效用函数满足spence-mirrlees条件，因此政府可以通过设计合适的工资制度和对腐败的惩治力度，把高腐败倾向的应聘者和低腐败倾向的应聘者分开，从而使得具...
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公务员挑选：机制设计观点
本文共10页 5000字左右
摘要
文章从委托-代理的框架上分析了公务员的腐败问题，认为公务员的挑选实际上是一个机制设计问题。由于应聘者的期望效用函数满足Spence-Mirrlees条件，因此政府可以通过设计合适的工资制度和对腐败的惩治力度，把高腐败倾向的应聘者和低腐败倾向的应聘者分开，从而使得具有低腐败倾向的应聘者成为公务员。
关键词：
Selecting Civil Servant: mechanism design viewpoint
Abstract
This article analyzes the corruption problem under the frame of principal-agent model, and argues that the hiring of a civil servant is a problem of mechanism design. As the expect utility function satisfy Spence-Mirrlees condition, the government can design appropriate salary and punishment to separate the employee with high corruption inclination from that with low corruption inclination, and hires the less corrupt to be civil servant.
Keyword: Corruption, Principal-Agent, Mechanism Design, Spence-Mirrlees Condition
目录
一、引言
二、工资制度、惩腐力度与公务员的挑选
四、结论
三、机制设计观点
参考文献
Andvig, Jens Christopher, “The Economics of Corruption: A survey,” Studi economici, 46 (1991).
Banfield, Edward, “Corruption as Feature of Government Organization,” Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (1975), 587-605.
Banerjee, Abhijit V., “A Theory of Misgovernance,” Quarterly Journal of economics, 112 (1997), 1289-1332.
Bardhan, Pranab, “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,” Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1997).
Baron, David P., and Roger B. Myerson, “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs,” Econometrica, 50 (1982), 911-930.
Becker, Gary S., “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy, 76 (1968), 169-217
Becker, Gary S., and Georage J. Stiger, “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers,” Journal of Legal studies, 3 (1974), 1-19.
Eskeland, Gunnar and Henrik Thiele, “Corruption under Moral Hazard,” Washington DC, 1999, World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 2204.
Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole, Game Theory, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991.
Guednerie, R., and Jean-Jacques Laffont, “A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-Agent Problems with an Application to Control of Self-Managed Firm,” Journal of Public Economics, 25 (1984), 329-369.
Klitagarrd, Robert, Controlling Corruption, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988
____, “Gifts and Bribes,” in Richard Zeckhauser, ed., Strategy and Choice, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
Kofman, Fred, and Jacques Lawarree, “Collusion in Hierarchical Agency,” Econometrica, 61 (1993), 629-656.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, The Economics of Uncertainty and Information, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989.
Maskin, E., and John Reley, “Monopoly with Incomplete Information,” Rand Journal of Economics, 15 (1984), 171-196.
Mirrlees, J., “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation,” Review of Economic Studies, 38 (1971), 175-208.
本文共10页 5000字左右
摘要
文章从委托-代理的框架上分析了公务员的腐败问题，认为公务员的挑选实际上是一个机制设计问题。由于应聘者的期望效用函数满足Spence-Mirrlees条件，因此政府可以通过设计合适的工资制度和对腐败的惩治力度，把高腐败倾向的应聘者和低腐败倾向的应聘者分开，从而使得具有低腐败倾向的应聘者成为公务员。
关键词：
Selecting Civil Servant: mechanism design viewpoint
Abstract
This article analyzes the corruption problem under the frame of principal-agent model, and argues that the hiring of a civil servant is a problem of mechanism design. As the expect utility function satisfy Spence-Mirrlees condition, the government can design appropriate salary and punishment to separate the employee with high corruption inclination from that with low corruption inclination, and hires the less corrupt to be civil servant.
Keyword: Corruption, Principal-Agent, Mechanism Design, Spence-Mirrlees Condition
目录
一、引言
二、工资制度、惩腐力度与公务员的挑选
四、结论
三、机制设计观点
参考文献
Andvig, Jens Christopher, “The Economics of Corruption: A survey,” Studi economici, 46 (1991).
Banfield, Edward, “Corruption as Feature of Government Organization,” Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (1975), 587-605.
Banerjee, Abhijit V., “A Theory of Misgovernance,” Quarterly Journal of economics, 112 (1997), 1289-1332.
Bardhan, Pranab, “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,” Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1997).
Baron, David P., and Roger B. Myerson, “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs,” Econometrica, 50 (1982), 911-930.
Becker, Gary S., “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy, 76 (1968), 169-217
Becker, Gary S., and Georage J. Stiger, “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers,” Journal of Legal studies, 3 (1974), 1-19.
Eskeland, Gunnar and Henrik Thiele, “Corruption under Moral Hazard,” Washington DC, 1999, World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 2204.
Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole, Game Theory, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991.
Guednerie, R., and Jean-Jacques Laffont, “A Complete Solution to a Class of Principal-Agent Problems with an Application to Control of Self-Managed Firm,” Journal of Public Economics, 25 (1984), 329-369.
Klitagarrd, Robert, Controlling Corruption, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988
____, “Gifts and Bribes,” in Richard Zeckhauser, ed., Strategy and Choice, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
Kofman, Fred, and Jacques Lawarree, “Collusion in Hierarchical Agency,” Econometrica, 61 (1993), 629-656.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, The Economics of Uncertainty and Information, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989.
Maskin, E., and John Reley, “Monopoly with Incomplete Information,” Rand Journal of Economics, 15 (1984), 171-196.
Mirrlees, J., “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation,” Review of Economic Studies, 38 (1971), 175-208.
