会计信息质量在投资中的决策作用影响_外文翻译.doc
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会计信息质量在投资中的决策作用影响_外文翻译,会计信息质量在投资中的决策作用对私人信息和监测的影响_外文翻译简介 管理者与外部资本的供应商信息是不对称的在这种情况下企业是如何影响金融资本的投资的呢？越来越多的证据表明，会计质量越好，越可以减少信息的不对称和对融资成本的约束。与此相一致的可能性是，减少了具有更高敏感性的会计质量的公司的投资对内部产生的现金流量。威...
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会计信息质量在投资中的决策作用对私人信息和监测的影响_外文翻译
简介
管理者与外部资本的供应商信息是不对称的在这种情况下企业是如何影响金融资本的投资的呢？越来越多的证据表明，会计质量越好，越可以减少信息的不对称和对融资成本的约束。与此相一致的可能性是，减少了具有更高敏感性的会计质量的公司的投资对内部产生的现金流量。威尔第和希拉里发现，对企业投资和与投资相关的会计质量容易不足，是容易引发过度投资的原因。
当投资效率低下时，会计的质量重要性可以减轻外部资本的影响，供应商有可能获得私人信息或可直接监测管理人员。通过访问个人信息与控制管理行为，外部资本的供应商可以直接影响企业的投资，降低了会计质量的重要性。符合这个想法的还有比德尔和希拉里的比较会计对不同国家的投资质量效益的影响。他们发现，会计品质的影响在于美国投资效益，而不是在日本。他们认为，一个可能的解释是不同的是债务和股权的美国版本的资本结构混合了SUS的日本企业。
我们研究如何通过会计质量灵敏度的重要性来延长不同资金来源对企业的投资现金流量的不同影响。直接测试如何影响不同的融资来源会计，通过最近获得了债务融资的公司来投资敏感性现金流的质量的效果，债务融资的比较说明了对那些不能够通过他们的能力获得融资的没有影响。为了缓解这一问题，我们限制我们的样本公司有所有最近获得的债务融资和利用访问的差异信息和监测通过公共私人债务获得连续贷款的建议。我们承认，投资内部现金流敏感性可能较低获得债务融资的可能性。然而，这种可能性偏见拒绝了我们的假设。
Introduction
Information asymmetry between managers and outside capital suppliers can affect how firms finance capital investments. A growing body of evidence indicates that better accounting quality can reduce information asymmetry costs and reduce financing constraints. Consistent with this possibility, Bid- dle and Hilary (2006) document that higher accounting quality reduces the sensitivity of firms’ investment to their internally generated cash flows. Verdi (2006) and Biddle, Hillary, and Verdi (2009) find that accounting quality is positively correlated with investment for firms prone to under- invest and is negatively correlated with investment for firms prone tooverinvest.
The importance of accounting quality on investment inefficiency may be mitigated when outside capital suppliers have private information or can directly monitor managers. By accessing private information and controlling managerial actions, outside capital suppliers can directly affect a firm’s investments, reducing the importance of accounting quality. Consistent with this idea, Biddle and Hilary (2006) compare the influence of accounting quality on investment efficiency across countries. They find that accounting quality influences investment efficiency in the United States, but not in Japan. They suggest that one potential explanation for this cross-country difference is the mix of debt and equity in the capital structures of U.S. ver-sus Japanese firms.
We extend this research by examining how different sources of financing affect the importance of accounting quality on firms’ investment–cash flow sensitivity. Directly testing how different sources of financing influence the effect of accounting quality on the investment–cash flow sensitivity is chal-lenging because a comparison of firms that recently obtained debt financing to those that did not could be affected by their ability to obtain financing.To alleviate this problem, we restrict our sample to firms that have all recently obtained debt financing and exploit the differences in access to pri-vate information and monitoring that exist across the public debt to private lending continuum as suggested by Diamond 1991.1 We acknowledge that the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows may be lower immedi-ately after obtaining debt financing. However, this possibility would bias against rejecting our hypotheses.
Specifically, we identify a sample of 1,163 firms on the Securities Data-corp (SDC) database that have recently raised capital through the issuance of either public debt or syndicated bank debt. We restrict our sample to firms that have recently obtained debt financing to hold constant the firm characteristics associated with borrowing. However, within the sample of firms that have recently obtained debt financing, there are likely to be sig-nificant differences in the capital provider’s access to private information and the constraints they place on managerial actions. Diamond’s (1991) theory implies that public debt holders have less access to private information and are thus less effective in monitoring bor-rowers than banks. Based on these arguments, we predict that accounting quality should have a larger influence on firms’ investment–cash flow sensi-tivity for firms with public debt than for those with bank debt. Second, we expec..
简介
管理者与外部资本的供应商信息是不对称的在这种情况下企业是如何影响金融资本的投资的呢？越来越多的证据表明，会计质量越好，越可以减少信息的不对称和对融资成本的约束。与此相一致的可能性是，减少了具有更高敏感性的会计质量的公司的投资对内部产生的现金流量。威尔第和希拉里发现，对企业投资和与投资相关的会计质量容易不足，是容易引发过度投资的原因。
当投资效率低下时，会计的质量重要性可以减轻外部资本的影响，供应商有可能获得私人信息或可直接监测管理人员。通过访问个人信息与控制管理行为，外部资本的供应商可以直接影响企业的投资，降低了会计质量的重要性。符合这个想法的还有比德尔和希拉里的比较会计对不同国家的投资质量效益的影响。他们发现，会计品质的影响在于美国投资效益，而不是在日本。他们认为，一个可能的解释是不同的是债务和股权的美国版本的资本结构混合了SUS的日本企业。
我们研究如何通过会计质量灵敏度的重要性来延长不同资金来源对企业的投资现金流量的不同影响。直接测试如何影响不同的融资来源会计，通过最近获得了债务融资的公司来投资敏感性现金流的质量的效果，债务融资的比较说明了对那些不能够通过他们的能力获得融资的没有影响。为了缓解这一问题，我们限制我们的样本公司有所有最近获得的债务融资和利用访问的差异信息和监测通过公共私人债务获得连续贷款的建议。我们承认，投资内部现金流敏感性可能较低获得债务融资的可能性。然而，这种可能性偏见拒绝了我们的假设。
Introduction
Information asymmetry between managers and outside capital suppliers can affect how firms finance capital investments. A growing body of evidence indicates that better accounting quality can reduce information asymmetry costs and reduce financing constraints. Consistent with this possibility, Bid- dle and Hilary (2006) document that higher accounting quality reduces the sensitivity of firms’ investment to their internally generated cash flows. Verdi (2006) and Biddle, Hillary, and Verdi (2009) find that accounting quality is positively correlated with investment for firms prone to under- invest and is negatively correlated with investment for firms prone tooverinvest.
The importance of accounting quality on investment inefficiency may be mitigated when outside capital suppliers have private information or can directly monitor managers. By accessing private information and controlling managerial actions, outside capital suppliers can directly affect a firm’s investments, reducing the importance of accounting quality. Consistent with this idea, Biddle and Hilary (2006) compare the influence of accounting quality on investment efficiency across countries. They find that accounting quality influences investment efficiency in the United States, but not in Japan. They suggest that one potential explanation for this cross-country difference is the mix of debt and equity in the capital structures of U.S. ver-sus Japanese firms.
We extend this research by examining how different sources of financing affect the importance of accounting quality on firms’ investment–cash flow sensitivity. Directly testing how different sources of financing influence the effect of accounting quality on the investment–cash flow sensitivity is chal-lenging because a comparison of firms that recently obtained debt financing to those that did not could be affected by their ability to obtain financing.To alleviate this problem, we restrict our sample to firms that have all recently obtained debt financing and exploit the differences in access to pri-vate information and monitoring that exist across the public debt to private lending continuum as suggested by Diamond 1991.1 We acknowledge that the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows may be lower immedi-ately after obtaining debt financing. However, this possibility would bias against rejecting our hypotheses.
Specifically, we identify a sample of 1,163 firms on the Securities Data-corp (SDC) database that have recently raised capital through the issuance of either public debt or syndicated bank debt. We restrict our sample to firms that have recently obtained debt financing to hold constant the firm characteristics associated with borrowing. However, within the sample of firms that have recently obtained debt financing, there are likely to be sig-nificant differences in the capital provider’s access to private information and the constraints they place on managerial actions. Diamond’s (1991) theory implies that public debt holders have less access to private information and are thus less effective in monitoring bor-rowers than banks. Based on these arguments, we predict that accounting quality should have a larger influence on firms’ investment–cash flow sensi-tivity for firms with public debt than for those with bank debt. Second, we expec..
