对经理薪资报酬中最优股权配置的探讨.doc

对经理薪资报酬中最优股权配置的探讨

页数 5 字数 5653

摘 要 论文对经理股权报酬和非股权报酬的优化组合激励问题进行了探讨。通过分析建立了组合激励的两阶段搏弈模型，通过搏弈分析和优化分析得到了经理最优薪资报酬组合和最优股权配置比例。结合构成股权配置比例的各参数的含义，探讨了它们的变化对最优股权配置比例的影响，指出了经理股权配置比例设计工作中应该注意的一些问题。

关键词 股权,薪资,组合,激励,搏弈

Abstract In this paper, we study a manager’s optimum constitute incentive of share ownership’s salary and non-share ownership’s salary. We establish a two-stage model of game in combination of incentive through analysis. We get the optimum combination of salary and optimum share ownership using game’ analysis and optimum research. We analyze the influence of reference number to the excellent combination. We point out some problems that would notice in designing a manager’s optimum share ownership.
Key word share; salary; combination; incentive; game
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