“搭便车”与公司治理结构中股东行为的分析.doc
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“搭便车”与公司治理结构中股东行为的分析,8000字 10页内容提要：本文讨论的是公司治理结构中小股东搭便车的问题，并进一步对公司治理结构中股东行为进行了分析。作者提出，一方面由于集体行动和股权结构，小股东搭监督的便车；另一方面，小股东并没有因为“搭便车”获得额外的利益，反而往往自己利益受到侵害，股东代表大会将流于形式。...
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“搭便车”与公司治理结构中股东行为的分析
8000字 10页
内容提要：本文讨论的是公司治理结构中小股东搭便车的问题，并进一步对公司治理结构中股东行为进行了分析。作者提出，一方面由于集体行动和股权结构，小股东搭监督的便车；另一方面，小股东并没有因为“搭便车”获得额外的利益，反而往往自己利益受到侵害，股东代表大会将流于形式。由于资本锁定和未来的信息收益，大股趋向于提供监督，并有可能通过侵害小股东的利益获得监督租金。在资本市场给定的状况下，监督租金的大小由法律制度决定。作者认为为了维护资本市场和公司治理结构的的有效性，如何保护股东间的实质性平等以及保护小股东的合法权益是重要的。
关键词： 股东行为 监督 搭便车 博弈
Free-rider problem and the behaviors of shareholders
in corporate governance
Abstract
This article analyzes the free-rider problem in corporate control, and develops a game-theoretic model to further analyze the behaviors of shareholders. We show the small shareholders take free-riding on monitor by reason of the collective action and the share of stock, unlike other free-rider, they haven’t been beneficial from free-riding, but got loss. Furthermore, free-rider problem make the meeting of stockholders exist in name only. The large shareholders have incentive to provide corporate monitoring for the capital lock-in and the benefit of information trading in future market, and have opportunity to extract monitoring rent by seizing interest of small shareholders. Given the condition of capital market, the monitoring rent is determined by legal system. We conclude in order to hold the effective of capital market and corporate governance, it is important to protect the rights and interests of small shareholders for institution designer.
8000字 10页
内容提要：本文讨论的是公司治理结构中小股东搭便车的问题，并进一步对公司治理结构中股东行为进行了分析。作者提出，一方面由于集体行动和股权结构，小股东搭监督的便车；另一方面，小股东并没有因为“搭便车”获得额外的利益，反而往往自己利益受到侵害，股东代表大会将流于形式。由于资本锁定和未来的信息收益，大股趋向于提供监督，并有可能通过侵害小股东的利益获得监督租金。在资本市场给定的状况下，监督租金的大小由法律制度决定。作者认为为了维护资本市场和公司治理结构的的有效性，如何保护股东间的实质性平等以及保护小股东的合法权益是重要的。
关键词： 股东行为 监督 搭便车 博弈
Free-rider problem and the behaviors of shareholders
in corporate governance
Abstract
This article analyzes the free-rider problem in corporate control, and develops a game-theoretic model to further analyze the behaviors of shareholders. We show the small shareholders take free-riding on monitor by reason of the collective action and the share of stock, unlike other free-rider, they haven’t been beneficial from free-riding, but got loss. Furthermore, free-rider problem make the meeting of stockholders exist in name only. The large shareholders have incentive to provide corporate monitoring for the capital lock-in and the benefit of information trading in future market, and have opportunity to extract monitoring rent by seizing interest of small shareholders. Given the condition of capital market, the monitoring rent is determined by legal system. We conclude in order to hold the effective of capital market and corporate governance, it is important to protect the rights and interests of small shareholders for institution designer.
