小议公务员挑选.doc
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小议公务员挑选,8000字 10页摘要一、引言二、工资制度、惩腐力度与公务员的挑选三、机制设计观点四、结论参考文献摘要文章从委托-代理的框架上分析了公务员的腐败问题，认为公务员的挑选实际上是一个机制设计问题。由于应聘者的期望效用函数满足spence-mirrlees条件，因此政府可以通过设计合适的工资制度和对腐败的惩治力...
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小议公务员挑选
8000字 10页
摘要
一、引言
二、工资制度、惩腐力度与公务员的挑选
三、机制设计观点
四、结论
参考文献
摘要
文章从委托-代理的框架上分析了公务员的腐败问题，认为公务员的挑选实际上是一个机制设计问题。由于应聘者的期望效用函数满足Spence-Mirrlees条件，因此政府可以通过设计合适的工资制度和对腐败的惩治力度，把高腐败倾向的应聘者和低腐败倾向的应聘者分开，从而使得具有低腐败倾向的应聘者成为公务员。
关键词：腐败、委托—代理、机制设计、Spence-Mirrlees条件
Selecting Civil Servant: mechanism design viewpoint
Abstract
This article analyzes the corruption problem under the frame of principal-agent model, and argues that the hiring of a civil servant is a problem of mechanism design. As the expect utility function satisfy Spence-Mirrlees condition, the government can design appropriate salary and punishment to separate the employee with high corruption inclination from that with low corruption inclination, and hires the less corrupt to be civil servant.
Keyword: Corruption, Principal-Agent, Mechanism Design, Spence-Mirrlees Condition
参考文献
Bardhan, Pranab, “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,” Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1997).
Baron, David P., and Roger B. Myerson, “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs,” Econometrica, 50 (1982), 911-930.
8000字 10页
摘要
一、引言
二、工资制度、惩腐力度与公务员的挑选
三、机制设计观点
四、结论
参考文献
摘要
文章从委托-代理的框架上分析了公务员的腐败问题，认为公务员的挑选实际上是一个机制设计问题。由于应聘者的期望效用函数满足Spence-Mirrlees条件，因此政府可以通过设计合适的工资制度和对腐败的惩治力度，把高腐败倾向的应聘者和低腐败倾向的应聘者分开，从而使得具有低腐败倾向的应聘者成为公务员。
关键词：腐败、委托—代理、机制设计、Spence-Mirrlees条件
Selecting Civil Servant: mechanism design viewpoint
Abstract
This article analyzes the corruption problem under the frame of principal-agent model, and argues that the hiring of a civil servant is a problem of mechanism design. As the expect utility function satisfy Spence-Mirrlees condition, the government can design appropriate salary and punishment to separate the employee with high corruption inclination from that with low corruption inclination, and hires the less corrupt to be civil servant.
Keyword: Corruption, Principal-Agent, Mechanism Design, Spence-Mirrlees Condition
参考文献
Bardhan, Pranab, “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues,” Journal of Economic Literature, 35 (1997).
Baron, David P., and Roger B. Myerson, “Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs,” Econometrica, 50 (1982), 911-930.
