公司特征、股权结构与现金持有量的实证研究.doc
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公司特征、股权结构与现金持有量的实证研究,59页共计30884字摘 要现金持有量对公司而言，会影响到公司的投资和筹资决策，也会影响到管理层的消费行为，还会影响到公司在资本市场上被收购的可能性。本文以1995年到2004年沪、深股市去除金融行业的所有行业上市公司为样本，通过静态回归模型、动态回归模型以及差分分层回归来分析中...
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公司特征、股权结构与现金持有量的实证研究
59页共计30884字
摘 要
现金持有量对公司而言，会影响到公司的投资和筹资决策，也会影响到管理层的消费行为，还会影响到公司在资本市场上被收购的可能性。本文以1995年到2004年沪、深股市去除金融行业的所有行业上市公司为样本，通过静态回归模型、动态回归模型以及差分分层回归来分析中国上市公司的公司特征因素、股权结构因素对其公司现金持有量的影响。
本文的研究发现，很大一部分的公司特征因素都对公司的现金持有量有显著影响。结果是部分与权衡理论的预期相符，部分与优序融资理论的预期相符。而具有中国特色的股权结构因素，如：国有还是非国有，第一大股东持股比例等，也表现出对公司的现金持有量有影响。
目 录
摘 要 Ⅱ
ABSTRACT Ⅲ
目 录 Ⅳ
引 言 1
1.问题的提出 1
2.研究目的 1
3.研究方法 2
4.论文内容 2
5.论文创新之处 3
第1章 文献综述 4
1.1国内外研究文献综述 4
1.2研究方法综述 7
第2章 理论依据及研究假设 13
2.1权衡理论模型 13
2.2优序融资理论模型 17
2.3股权结构与公司现金持有量 18
2.4研究假设 20
第3章 样本、变量与模型 24
3.1样本选择与数据处理 24
3.2变量的定义 24
3.3数据模型 26
第4章 实证研究 28
4.1描述性统计分析 28
4.2相关性检验 29
4.3静态模型回归分析结果 31
4.4动态模型回归分析结果 38
结 论 48
参考文献 50
后 记 53
论文原创性声明 55
关键词： 公司特征， 股权结构， 现金持有量
参考文献
1. Tim Opler, Lee Pinkowitz, Rene Stulz and Rohan Williamson .The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 1999, 52: 3-46
2. Lee Pinkowitz, Rohan Willianmson .Bank Power and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Japan. The Review of Financial Studies Winter 2001, Vol.14, No.4: 1059-1082
3. Aydin Ozkan, Neslihan Ozkan .Corporate cash holdings: An empirical investigation of UK companies. Journal of Banking&Finance 2004, 28: 2113-2134
4. Yilmaz Guney, Aydin Ozkan and Neslihan Ozkan .Additional international evidence on corporate cash holdings. Working paper, Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD, UK, 2003
5. Amy Dittmar, Jan Mahrt-Smith and Henri Servaes .International corporate governance and corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2003, Vol.38, No.1
6. Macey J.R., and G.P. Miller .Universal Banks Are Not the Answer to America’s Corporate Governance “Problem”: A Look at Germany, Japan, and the U.S.. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1997, 9, 57-73.
7. Diamond, D.2. .Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring . Review of Economic Studies 1984, 51, 393-414
8. Boyd, J., Prescott, E.C. .Financial intermediary-coalitions. Journal of Economic Theory 1986, 38, 211-232.
9. Berlin, M., Loeys, J. .Bond covenants and delegated monitoring. Journal of Finance 1988, 43, 397-412
10. Fama, E. .What’s different about banks. Journal of Monetary Economics 1985, 15, 29-39
11. Fama, E., Jensen, M. .Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 1983, 26, 301-325
12. Chemmanur, T.J., Fulghieri, P. .Reputation, renegotiation and the choice between bank loans and publicly traded debt. The Review of Financial Studies 1994, 7,475-506
13. Myers, Stewart C. and Nicholas Majluf .Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 1984,13,187-221.
14. Antunovich, Peter .Optimal slack policy under asymmetric information. Manuscript, Northwestern University, 1996
15. Stiglitz, J. .Credit markets and the control of capital. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 1985, 17,133-152
16. Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W. .Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 1986, 95, 461-488
17. Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W. .A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 1997, 52, 737-784
18. Flannery, M.J. .Asymmetric information and risky debt maturity choice. Journal of Finance 1986, 41, 19-37
19. Kale, J.R., Noe, T.H. .Risky debt maturity choice in a sequential equilibrium. Journal of Financial Research 1990, 13, 155-165
20. Diamond, D.W. .Seniority and maturity of debt contracts. Journal of Financial Economics 1993,33, 341-368
21. Kim, Chang-Soo, Mauer, D.C., Sherman, A. E. .The determinants of corporate liquidity: theory and evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 1998, 33, 305-334
22. Myers, S.C.. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 1997, 5, 147-175
23 .Myers, S.C., Majluf, N.S. .Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 1984, 13, 187-221
24. Borokhovich, K.A., Parrino, R., Trapani, T. .Outside directors and CEO selection. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 1996, 31, 337-355
25. Mayer. D. , Shivdasani, A., Smith, C. . Board composition and corporate control: Evidence from the insurance industry. Journal of Business 1997, 70, 33-62
26. Rosenstein, S., Wyatt, J. .Insider directors, board effectiveness and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics 1997, 44, 229-250
27. Wayne H. Mikkelson and M. Megan Partch .Do persistent large cash reserves hinder performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2003, Vol.38, No.2
28. 张献华，姜秀珍，田亮. 影响企业现金持有量的经济学诠释. 经济问题探索，2004，3
29. 陈祖华，朱庆仙. 公司治理模式的国际比较及启示——从资本结构角度的分析. 南京审计学院学报，2005，1
30. 李增泉，孙铮，王志伟. “掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据. 会计研究，2004，12
31. 吴晓求. 中国上市公司：资本结构于公司治理. 中国人民大学出版社，2003
59页共计30884字
摘 要
现金持有量对公司而言，会影响到公司的投资和筹资决策，也会影响到管理层的消费行为，还会影响到公司在资本市场上被收购的可能性。本文以1995年到2004年沪、深股市去除金融行业的所有行业上市公司为样本，通过静态回归模型、动态回归模型以及差分分层回归来分析中国上市公司的公司特征因素、股权结构因素对其公司现金持有量的影响。
本文的研究发现，很大一部分的公司特征因素都对公司的现金持有量有显著影响。结果是部分与权衡理论的预期相符，部分与优序融资理论的预期相符。而具有中国特色的股权结构因素，如：国有还是非国有，第一大股东持股比例等，也表现出对公司的现金持有量有影响。
目 录
摘 要 Ⅱ
ABSTRACT Ⅲ
目 录 Ⅳ
引 言 1
1.问题的提出 1
2.研究目的 1
3.研究方法 2
4.论文内容 2
5.论文创新之处 3
第1章 文献综述 4
1.1国内外研究文献综述 4
1.2研究方法综述 7
第2章 理论依据及研究假设 13
2.1权衡理论模型 13
2.2优序融资理论模型 17
2.3股权结构与公司现金持有量 18
2.4研究假设 20
第3章 样本、变量与模型 24
3.1样本选择与数据处理 24
3.2变量的定义 24
3.3数据模型 26
第4章 实证研究 28
4.1描述性统计分析 28
4.2相关性检验 29
4.3静态模型回归分析结果 31
4.4动态模型回归分析结果 38
结 论 48
参考文献 50
后 记 53
论文原创性声明 55
关键词： 公司特征， 股权结构， 现金持有量
参考文献
1. Tim Opler, Lee Pinkowitz, Rene Stulz and Rohan Williamson .The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics 1999, 52: 3-46
2. Lee Pinkowitz, Rohan Willianmson .Bank Power and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Japan. The Review of Financial Studies Winter 2001, Vol.14, No.4: 1059-1082
3. Aydin Ozkan, Neslihan Ozkan .Corporate cash holdings: An empirical investigation of UK companies. Journal of Banking&Finance 2004, 28: 2113-2134
4. Yilmaz Guney, Aydin Ozkan and Neslihan Ozkan .Additional international evidence on corporate cash holdings. Working paper, Department of Economics and Related Studies, University of York, Heslington, York, YO10 5DD, UK, 2003
5. Amy Dittmar, Jan Mahrt-Smith and Henri Servaes .International corporate governance and corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2003, Vol.38, No.1
6. Macey J.R., and G.P. Miller .Universal Banks Are Not the Answer to America’s Corporate Governance “Problem”: A Look at Germany, Japan, and the U.S.. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 1997, 9, 57-73.
7. Diamond, D.2. .Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring . Review of Economic Studies 1984, 51, 393-414
8. Boyd, J., Prescott, E.C. .Financial intermediary-coalitions. Journal of Economic Theory 1986, 38, 211-232.
9. Berlin, M., Loeys, J. .Bond covenants and delegated monitoring. Journal of Finance 1988, 43, 397-412
10. Fama, E. .What’s different about banks. Journal of Monetary Economics 1985, 15, 29-39
11. Fama, E., Jensen, M. .Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics 1983, 26, 301-325
12. Chemmanur, T.J., Fulghieri, P. .Reputation, renegotiation and the choice between bank loans and publicly traded debt. The Review of Financial Studies 1994, 7,475-506
13. Myers, Stewart C. and Nicholas Majluf .Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 1984,13,187-221.
14. Antunovich, Peter .Optimal slack policy under asymmetric information. Manuscript, Northwestern University, 1996
15. Stiglitz, J. .Credit markets and the control of capital. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 1985, 17,133-152
16. Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W. .Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 1986, 95, 461-488
17. Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W. .A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 1997, 52, 737-784
18. Flannery, M.J. .Asymmetric information and risky debt maturity choice. Journal of Finance 1986, 41, 19-37
19. Kale, J.R., Noe, T.H. .Risky debt maturity choice in a sequential equilibrium. Journal of Financial Research 1990, 13, 155-165
20. Diamond, D.W. .Seniority and maturity of debt contracts. Journal of Financial Economics 1993,33, 341-368
21. Kim, Chang-Soo, Mauer, D.C., Sherman, A. E. .The determinants of corporate liquidity: theory and evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 1998, 33, 305-334
22. Myers, S.C.. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 1997, 5, 147-175
23 .Myers, S.C., Majluf, N.S. .Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 1984, 13, 187-221
24. Borokhovich, K.A., Parrino, R., Trapani, T. .Outside directors and CEO selection. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 1996, 31, 337-355
25. Mayer. D. , Shivdasani, A., Smith, C. . Board composition and corporate control: Evidence from the insurance industry. Journal of Business 1997, 70, 33-62
26. Rosenstein, S., Wyatt, J. .Insider directors, board effectiveness and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics 1997, 44, 229-250
27. Wayne H. Mikkelson and M. Megan Partch .Do persistent large cash reserves hinder performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2003, Vol.38, No.2
28. 张献华，姜秀珍，田亮. 影响企业现金持有量的经济学诠释. 经济问题探索，2004，3
29. 陈祖华，朱庆仙. 公司治理模式的国际比较及启示——从资本结构角度的分析. 南京审计学院学报，2005，1
30. 李增泉，孙铮，王志伟. “掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据. 会计研究，2004，12
31. 吴晓求. 中国上市公司：资本结构于公司治理. 中国人民大学出版社，2003
