最优阈值的增值税(外文翻译).rar
最优阈值的增值税(外文翻译),包含中文翻译和英文原文，内容详细完整，建议下载参考！中文： 2500 字英文： 8200 字符摘要 增值税的主要特点之一，而且往往是最有争议的，是高水平营业额企业有义务登记税。尽管其重要性，在适当的层次上设置这个门槛这个问题已经很少得到分析的注意。本文首先建立一个简单的规则描述在权衡税收和收...
该文档为压缩文件,包含的文件列表如下:
内容介绍
原文档由会员 xiaowei 发布
最优阈值的增值税(外文翻译)
包含中文翻译和英文原文，内容详细完整，建议下载参考！
中文： 2500 字
英文： 8200 字符
摘要
增值税的主要特点之一，而且往往是最有争议的，是高水平营业额企业有义务登记税。尽管其重要性，在适当的层次上设置这个门槛这个问题已经很少得到分析的注意。本文首先建立一个简单的规则描述在权衡税收和收集信息的成本的最优阈值（当企业的规模是固定的）。然后认为，原则上其影响的最佳阈值的生产效率低下所暗示的差别待遇的上面和下面的门槛。
1 导言
设计增值税（ VAT ）所应采取的最重要的决定是阈值水平营业额以上公司必须对他们的销项增值税负责（并有权声明他们的进项增值税） 。门槛太高妥协的基本目标是提高收入，过低的门槛有可能使当局陷入执行和实施过度纳税人遵从成本。设计问题进一步复杂化，而且，竞争与差别税收待遇扭曲了企业上面和下面的门槛。
毫不奇怪的是，选择门槛常常证明争议。在乌干达，例如，失败的增值税在1995年被平息，这在很大程度上是通过迅速增加的门槛，从20000美元至50000美元。适当水平的阈值也一直是埃及和巴基斯坦企图从生产到零售阶段延长新生增值税的焦点问题。即使是在欧洲联盟，在第六指令不久前提供了非常可观的统一增值税结构，悬殊的阈值水平，从一些会员国的零到英国的83 000美元左右仍然有些论点。文献最优间接税，然而，似乎完全忽视这个问题，通常假设所有购买的任何商品以相同的税率支付税款。 几乎无处不存在一个门槛，但是，这意味着实践中很少遇到（甚至在没有任何逃税） 。由于在近130个国家（其中超过70个已在过去10年通过）显着突出的增值税增加幅度，提高了世界四分之一的税收收入，了解适当的水平设置的门槛显然是有一些重要的意义......
Abstract
One of the key features of a value-added tax—and often one of the most contentious—is the threshold level of turnover at which firms are obliged to register for the tax. Despite its importance, however, the question of the appropriate level at which to set this threshold has received little analytical attention. This paper first develops a simple rule characterizing the optimal threshold (when firms’ sizes are fixed) in terms of a trade-off between tax revenues and collection costs. It then considers, in principle and by simulation, the implications for the optimal threshold of the production inefficiencies implied by the differential treatment of those above and below the threshold.
1. Introduction
One of the most important decisions to be taken in designing a value-added tax (VAT) is the threshold level f turnoover above which firms are required to charge VAT on their outputs (and entitled to reclaim1 tax on their inputs). Too high a threshold compromises the basic objective of raising revenue; too low a threshold may leave the authorities overwhelmed by the difficulties of implementation and impose excessive compliance costs on taxpayers. The design problem is further complicated, moreover, by the distortion of competition associated with the differential tax treatment of firms above and below the threshold.
Not surprisingly, the choice of threshold has often proved contentious. In Uganda, for instance, the near-failure of the VAT introduced in 1995 was quelled in large part by rapidly increasing the threshold from $20 000 to $50 000. The appropriate level of the threshold has also been a focal issue in the attempts to extend the nascent VATs from the manufacturing to the retail stage in both Egypt and Pakistan. Even in the European Union, where the Sixth Directive long ago provided for very considerable harmonization of value-added tax structures, the wide disparity of threshold levels—from zero in some member states to around $83 000 in the UK—remains a matter of some contention. The literature on optimal indirect taxation, however, seems to have entirely ignored this issue, typically assuming without comment that tax is payable at the same rate on all purchases of any commodity., 2 The almost ubiquitous presence of a threshold ......
包含中文翻译和英文原文，内容详细完整，建议下载参考！
中文： 2500 字
英文： 8200 字符
摘要
增值税的主要特点之一，而且往往是最有争议的，是高水平营业额企业有义务登记税。尽管其重要性，在适当的层次上设置这个门槛这个问题已经很少得到分析的注意。本文首先建立一个简单的规则描述在权衡税收和收集信息的成本的最优阈值（当企业的规模是固定的）。然后认为，原则上其影响的最佳阈值的生产效率低下所暗示的差别待遇的上面和下面的门槛。
1 导言
设计增值税（ VAT ）所应采取的最重要的决定是阈值水平营业额以上公司必须对他们的销项增值税负责（并有权声明他们的进项增值税） 。门槛太高妥协的基本目标是提高收入，过低的门槛有可能使当局陷入执行和实施过度纳税人遵从成本。设计问题进一步复杂化，而且，竞争与差别税收待遇扭曲了企业上面和下面的门槛。
毫不奇怪的是，选择门槛常常证明争议。在乌干达，例如，失败的增值税在1995年被平息，这在很大程度上是通过迅速增加的门槛，从20000美元至50000美元。适当水平的阈值也一直是埃及和巴基斯坦企图从生产到零售阶段延长新生增值税的焦点问题。即使是在欧洲联盟，在第六指令不久前提供了非常可观的统一增值税结构，悬殊的阈值水平，从一些会员国的零到英国的83 000美元左右仍然有些论点。文献最优间接税，然而，似乎完全忽视这个问题，通常假设所有购买的任何商品以相同的税率支付税款。 几乎无处不存在一个门槛，但是，这意味着实践中很少遇到（甚至在没有任何逃税） 。由于在近130个国家（其中超过70个已在过去10年通过）显着突出的增值税增加幅度，提高了世界四分之一的税收收入，了解适当的水平设置的门槛显然是有一些重要的意义......
Abstract
One of the key features of a value-added tax—and often one of the most contentious—is the threshold level of turnover at which firms are obliged to register for the tax. Despite its importance, however, the question of the appropriate level at which to set this threshold has received little analytical attention. This paper first develops a simple rule characterizing the optimal threshold (when firms’ sizes are fixed) in terms of a trade-off between tax revenues and collection costs. It then considers, in principle and by simulation, the implications for the optimal threshold of the production inefficiencies implied by the differential treatment of those above and below the threshold.
1. Introduction
One of the most important decisions to be taken in designing a value-added tax (VAT) is the threshold level f turnoover above which firms are required to charge VAT on their outputs (and entitled to reclaim1 tax on their inputs). Too high a threshold compromises the basic objective of raising revenue; too low a threshold may leave the authorities overwhelmed by the difficulties of implementation and impose excessive compliance costs on taxpayers. The design problem is further complicated, moreover, by the distortion of competition associated with the differential tax treatment of firms above and below the threshold.
Not surprisingly, the choice of threshold has often proved contentious. In Uganda, for instance, the near-failure of the VAT introduced in 1995 was quelled in large part by rapidly increasing the threshold from $20 000 to $50 000. The appropriate level of the threshold has also been a focal issue in the attempts to extend the nascent VATs from the manufacturing to the retail stage in both Egypt and Pakistan. Even in the European Union, where the Sixth Directive long ago provided for very considerable harmonization of value-added tax structures, the wide disparity of threshold levels—from zero in some member states to around $83 000 in the UK—remains a matter of some contention. The literature on optimal indirect taxation, however, seems to have entirely ignored this issue, typically assuming without comment that tax is payable at the same rate on all purchases of any commodity., 2 The almost ubiquitous presence of a threshold ......
