失真和最优激励合同的风险[外文翻译].rar
失真和最优激励合同的风险[外文翻译],包括中文翻译和英文原文中文：6345字英文：23500字符失真和最优激励合同的风险乔治．贝克摘要：绩效测量是任何激励机制设计的重要组成部分。诚信企业的激励机制和组织中的价值是所可用的措施的强烈表现。然而，对有价值的性能措施的特点还没有充分探讨了文学社。在本文中，我使用一个多任务模型发...
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失真和最优激励合同的风险[外文翻译]
包括中文翻译和英文原文
中文：6345字
英文：23500字符
失真和最优激励合同的风险
乔治．贝克
摘要：绩效测量是任何激励机制设计的重要组成部分。诚信企业的激励机制和组织中的价值是所可用的措施的强烈表现。然而，对有价值的性能措施的特点还没有充分探讨了文学社。在本文中，我使用一个多任务模型发展措施的效能两个参数表征，并显示如何将-两个参数扭曲风险价值和影响使用性能的措施在激励合同。我表明，在现实世界中设计许多有复杂的问题且卓有成效的激励合同，可视为贸易这两个功能的取舍性能的措施。我也使用这个框架来分析在提供奖励的一些特定的环境，包括研发实验室和非营利组织
Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts.
George Baker
Forthcoming, Journal of Human Resources
Abstract：Performance measurement is an essential part of the design of any incentive system. The strength and value of incentives in organizations are strongly affected by the performance measures available. Yet, the characteristics of valuable performance measures have not been well explored in the agency literature. In this paper, I use a multi-task model to develop a two-parameter characterization of performance measures and show how these two parameters distortion and risk affect the value and use of performance measures in incentive contracts. I show that many complex issues in the design of real world incentive contracts can be fruitfully viewed as trade-offs between these two features of performance measures. I also use this framework to analyze the provision of incentives in several specific environments, including R&D labs and non-profit organizations.
1. Introduction
The provision of incentives to individuals and groups in organizations is one of the central problems in the economics of the firm. A long and varied literature considers the question of what optimal incentive contracts look like (see Gibbons 1998, for a review). Most of this literature examines the use of "risky" performance measures, and as a result focuses on what Gibbons calls "the much studied trade-off between incentives and insurance." Yet, in most incentive contracts in the real world, risk is not a central issue: with the exception of stock-based plans for top executives, most compensation arrangements in fact impose very little risk on employees. In addition, as Predergast (2000) points out, the data do not confirm the existence of a trade-off between risk and incentives.
包括中文翻译和英文原文
中文：6345字
英文：23500字符
失真和最优激励合同的风险
乔治．贝克
摘要：绩效测量是任何激励机制设计的重要组成部分。诚信企业的激励机制和组织中的价值是所可用的措施的强烈表现。然而，对有价值的性能措施的特点还没有充分探讨了文学社。在本文中，我使用一个多任务模型发展措施的效能两个参数表征，并显示如何将-两个参数扭曲风险价值和影响使用性能的措施在激励合同。我表明，在现实世界中设计许多有复杂的问题且卓有成效的激励合同，可视为贸易这两个功能的取舍性能的措施。我也使用这个框架来分析在提供奖励的一些特定的环境，包括研发实验室和非营利组织
Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts.
George Baker
Forthcoming, Journal of Human Resources
Abstract：Performance measurement is an essential part of the design of any incentive system. The strength and value of incentives in organizations are strongly affected by the performance measures available. Yet, the characteristics of valuable performance measures have not been well explored in the agency literature. In this paper, I use a multi-task model to develop a two-parameter characterization of performance measures and show how these two parameters distortion and risk affect the value and use of performance measures in incentive contracts. I show that many complex issues in the design of real world incentive contracts can be fruitfully viewed as trade-offs between these two features of performance measures. I also use this framework to analyze the provision of incentives in several specific environments, including R&D labs and non-profit organizations.
1. Introduction
The provision of incentives to individuals and groups in organizations is one of the central problems in the economics of the firm. A long and varied literature considers the question of what optimal incentive contracts look like (see Gibbons 1998, for a review). Most of this literature examines the use of "risky" performance measures, and as a result focuses on what Gibbons calls "the much studied trade-off between incentives and insurance." Yet, in most incentive contracts in the real world, risk is not a central issue: with the exception of stock-based plans for top executives, most compensation arrangements in fact impose very little risk on employees. In addition, as Predergast (2000) points out, the data do not confirm the existence of a trade-off between risk and incentives.
